How are we supposed to reach President Trump's goal of "energy dominance"? In his recent National Affairs article, Devin Hartman, director of energy and environmental policy at the R Street Institute, argues that America's energy future depends not on heavy-handed government intervention but on unleashing market forces.

At the heart of Hartman's argument is the conviction that the invisible hand of the market is the most effective mechanism for addressing America's power challenges. To Hartman, America's power industry is struggling to respond to surging demand because "public policy suppresses essential market signals." The problem, he argues, isn't physical constraints or lack of financing—"ample steel and magnets exist to produce enough electrons to go around" and "capital markets are hungry to finance power infrastructure." Rather, the true obstacle is government failure. This includes outdated regulatory models, fragmented centrally-planned systems, and perverse economic incentives that encourage utilities to inflate demand forecasts and overspend on infrastructure.

His proposed solution centers on competitive markets. Hartman points to evidence that in restructured states where electricity markets operate with less regulation, power is delivered more efficiently, innovation flourishes, and consumers benefit from lower prices. He cites the PJM Interconnection (covering the Mid-Atlantic region) as a natural experiment, where competitive suppliers consistently outperform monopoly utilities on cost metrics. Texas, with its robust electricity market restructuring, serves as Hartman's model state—leading the nation in renewable energy additions while attracting major energy consumers with its efficient permitting and competitive pricing.

Hartman recommends several specific regulatory reforms to liberate America's electric power. First, he advocates for full electricity market restructuring, moving beyond the current "hybrid paradigm" where wholesale markets exist but retail monopolies persist. He calls for expanded consumer choice, allowing large energy users to purchase directly from competitive suppliers rather than monopoly utilities. Second, Hartman pushes for reformed transmission policies, including a dramatic reduction in "exempt projects" that utilities can initiate without economic justification. He supports the enhancement of independent regional transmission planning that uses cost-benefit criteria and competitive bidding, which he says could save consumers over $270 billion. Third, he emphasizes streamlining the generator-interconnection process, which currently takes around five years to complete due to antiquated rules. Hartman also advocates for state-level reforms to distribution systems, including increased transparency in utility planning and hosting-capacity analyses to identify where the grid can accommodate new demand without expensive upgrades. Finally, he calls for an overhaul of permitting and siting restrictions at state and local levels, arguing they should be tied to specific harms rather than political considerations.

Most of these reforms are surely intelligent, and yet we could not help but see the contrast with the French model, which is hitherto the most successful in the world, as we outlined in a recent briefing, itself based on an interview with Mark Nelson of Radiant Energy Group. The problem with "liberalization" approaches, particularly when it comes to something both important and technical like national infrastructure, is that it seems to punt on making actual choices. Some energy sources are simply better than others.

France's nuclear program succeeded precisely because it concentrated decision-making authority in the hands of capable leaders like Marcel Boiteux at EDF, backed by strong political will and national purpose. The French approach embraced top-down planning, empowered a single utility monopoly, and prioritized ruthless execution over market competition. When faced with technical decisions, France made pragmatic choices based on efficiency rather than political considerations—for example, licensing American technology when it proved more cost-effective than domestic designs. (Something which public choice theorists inform us government bureaucrats are incapable of doing.)

The goal of "energy dominance" is not just simply to provide more power cheaper, it is to meet important national goals having to do with national security, especially the global race for AI. The goal is not just to provide whatever supply will meet demand in an efficiency-maximizing marketplace. It is (by definition) to provide more supply than the market demands, so as to reach national goals. In this context, waiting for the invisible hand to solve it may not be the answer.